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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
A-S MIARKED BY DEcisIo.Xs SELECTED FROM TIlE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ADOPTION.
The Supreme Court of lVaslihigton holds in Jans v.
James, 77 Pac. 1o82, that neither the false statement made
Validity by the natural father of an adopted boy at the
time of the adoption concerning the death of
the boy's mother, nor the fact that plaintiff would not have
adopted the boy had he known that his mother was living,
nor that the boy thereafter became incorrigible, and was
sent to a reform school from which he was subsequently
taken by his natural mother, nor that plaintiff after remov-
ing from the state in which the boy was adopted to Wash-
ington took no steps there to adopt tle boy, renders the
adoption invalid.
ALIENS.
In Hopkins, United States Marshal, et al. v. Fachant, x3o
Fed. 839, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth
marriage to Circuit) holds that where an alien woman who
Citizen has come into this country pending proceedings
for her deportation under the immigration laws marries a
citizen of the United States, she at once takes the status of
her husband, and, unless released from custody, is entitled
to be discharged on a writ of habeas corpus. See also City
of Minneapolis v. Reum, 6 C. C. A. 37 and note thereto.
ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW.
In Lathrop v. Hallett. 77 Pac. o95, the court of Colorado,
holding that retainer of counsel in a suit is not implied au-
Employing t -ority to him to employ associate counsel
Assistanlt therein at the expense of his client, decides that
knowledge by a client that his counsel is being assisted in the
case by another attoi ney is not enough to show that the client
ratifies the eniploymiet'. on his behalf by his counsel of such
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attorney, the fact of such assistance being consistent with the
employment of the attorney to assist the counsel at the lat-
ter's expense. It is further held that an attorney employed
by counsel to assist him in a case at his own expense is not
entitled to a lien on the judgment therein. Compare North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Clarke, io6 Fed. 794.
In Bro-wn v. Arnold, 131 Fed. 723, the United States'Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) decides that -whili
Authorty the general rule is said to be that the authority
Safter conferred upon a lawyer by his retainer in an
Judgment action or suit ceases when the judgment or de-
cree is rendered, there are many exceptions to this rule, and
in the actual practice of the law it is frequently disregarded.
Some of the established exceptions are that after judgment
or decree the authority of the attorney for the prevAiling
party to collect or enforce it, his authority to receipt for its
proceeds and to discharge it, his authority to admit service
of a citation to review it, and his authority to oppose any
steps that may be taken within a reasonable time to reverse it,
continue. Compare Berthold v. Fox, 21 Minn. 51.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Johnston v. Board
of Bernalillo County Com'rs, 78 Pac. 43, decides that the
Compensation personal representative of an attorney who per-
formed services under a contract for fees, but
died before full performance, can recover only such reason-
able proportion of the contract price as the services per-
formed bear to the whole services contracted for, or, as other-
wise stated, the reasonable value of the services performed.
See Gordon v. Miller, 14 Aid. 204.
BANKRUPTCY.
The United States District Court (E. D. Tennessee, S.
D.) decides In re Douglas Coal and Coke Co., 131 Fed. 769,
Appointment that under the Bankruptcy Act of i898, as
of Receivera amended by the Act of i9o3, in order that the
appointment of a receiver at the instance of another shall
constitute an act of bankruptcy, the appointment must have
been made "because of insolvency," and the appointment
of a receiver for the property of a corporation in a suit to
foreclose a mortgage, in which the bill does not allege in-
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solvency, but a breach of the covenants of the mortgage, does
not authorize an adjudication of bankruptcy against the cor-
poration, although it may in fact have been insolvent, and
such insolvency may have caused its default. Compare with
this case Blue Mountain Iron and Steel Co., I3 Fed. 57.
It is decided by the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals (Second Circuit) In re Frederick L. Grant Shoe Co.,
Unlquidated 130 Fed. 881, that a creditor having a provable
Claim claim, although the amount is unliquidated, may
file a petition in bankruptcy against his debtor, and further,
that a claim for damages for breach of a contract is one
founded "upon a contract" within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 and is consequently provable in bank-
ruptcy. Compare In re Stern, x 16 Fed. 6o4.
CARRIERS.
The Supreme Court of Washington holds in Normile v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 77 Pac. 1087, that in an action
R.so..b, against a carrier for the loss of goods, where
Tme to Re. there is no dispute about -the material facts, the
celve Goods question what is a reasonable time in which the
goods should have been removed by a consignee is for the
court. Compare Hedges v. Hudson River Rd. Co., 49 N. Y.
223.
CONSPIRACY.
In W1right v. Stewart, 13o Fed. 905, the United States
Circuit Court (District of Missouri, S. W. D.) considers a
conspiracy case in which the plaintiff had been defrauded by
to Defraud certain professional swindlers, the method used
being of such a nature as to convince the person defrauded
that he was to be successful by swindling another man. The
plaintiff having lost considerable money in consequence of
the scheme sued to recover it back and secured judgment
The case presents a most interesting and thorough review of
the questions involved, and the cases bearing upon the legal
principles controlling the decision are exhaustively reviewed.
Compare Catts v. Phalen, 2 Howard, 376. The court in the
principal case above- holds that although the plaintiff was in
delicto he was not in pari delicto with the others, whose real
aim was to defraud him.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Another decision dealing with the constitutionality of a
statute prohibiting the use of trading stamps occurs in State
Due Process v. Ramseyer. 58 Atl. 958, where it is held that a
of Law statute prohibiting the giving away of trading
stamps with articles of merchandise purchased, entitling the
purchaser to other articles on exhibition at the store of the
trading-stamp company, and making a violation thereof
punishable by fine, etc., is unconstitutional, as depriving a
citizen of the means of acquiring and possessing property,
and is not sustainable as within the police power of the state
on the ground that it was a proper regulation for the promo-
tion of the public welfare. Compare Statc v. Dodge, 56 At.
983.
CORPORATIONS.
In Schnittgcr v. Old Home Consol. Min. Co., 78 Pac. 9,
the Supreme Court of California, laying down the general
Loan of principle that where a proposition to borrow
Directors money from certain directors of a corporation
was carried by sufficient votes of other members of the board
of directors to render the same valid without the votes of the
lending directors, the fact that such lending directors were
present at the meeting and voted for the transaction did not
invalidate the same, holds under the facts of the case that the
fact that directors of a corporation loaning money to it did
not disclose to the other members of the board of directors
the fact that they were the real parties who were loaniiig the
money, or that the person in whose name the transaction was
had was merely a figurehead, did not invalidate it, in the
absei,ce of a showing that the corporation sustained some
loss by reason thereof, or that the loaning directors thereby
obtained an undue advantage over the corporation.
DAMAGES.
Uncertainty as to the profits which might have been made
if a given contract had not been broken frequently results in
Manufactured denying a plaintiff any substantial recovery.
Articles: Circumstances are presented in Lazier Gas En-
Speculative gine Co. v. DuBois, 13o Fed. 834. under which
Damages the court decides that sufficient certainty is pro-
duced to enable such profits to be estimated. It is there held
that where, in an action for breach of a contract to manufac-
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ture and sell certain machinery, plaintiff showed that the
average profit made during the sixteen months in which the
contract was performed was $911 per month, a verdict al-
lowing plaintiff profits at that rate during the eight remain-
ing months of the contract period after the breach was not
objectionable on the ground that such profits were remote
and speculative. Compare United States v. Behan, i1o U.
S. 339-
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.
In re Burnstine, I3' Fed. 828. it is decided by the United
States District Court (E. D. Michigan, S. D.) thai under
Claims: the Michigan act relating to death by wrongful
Assignability act, providing that an action may be brought by
an administrator, but that the recovery shall pass' to de-
cedent's next of kin, a father being entitled to the entire
recovery for the wrongful killing of his son, his right thereto
constituted assets belonging to his estate in bankruptcy
within the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Compare Findlay V.
Chicago Railroad Co., x06 Mich. 700.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
In Atlanta, K. and AT. Ry. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 131
Fed. 657, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Sixth
Priority of Circuit) decides that a statutory proceeding for
RiZht the condemnation of a right of way for railroad
purposes is but a substitute for its acquisition by c6ntract,
and the filing of a petition for condemnation by a railroad
company gives it no right as against another company which
previously obtained a deed from the owner for the same
purpose, although such deed was not recorded. It is further
held in the same case that a contract for the sale or convey-
ance by a landowner of a right of way to a railroad com-
pany, although in parol and executory, is good as against
another company which subsequently institutes proceedings
for condemnation of the same land, with notice that such an
agreement had been made, such company not being an inno-
cent purchaser protected by the Statute of Frauds. With
this decision compare M' and St. P. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co.,, 16 Iowa, 6 11.
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FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma decides in MAyalt v.
Ponca City Land and Improvement Co., 78 Pac. 185, that
Corporate a foreign corporation acting in excess of its con-
Authority ferred authority may be questioned as to its au-
thority only by the state. But where, in an action by a for-
eign corporation, there is an attempt on the part of such cor-
poration to acquire title to property vested in an individual,
such individual may deny its corporate capacity as a defence
to its right of recovery. It is indispensable, the court says,
that a corporation, seeking to invoke the doctrine of comity,
must first be possessed of some right, power, or privilege in
the country of its domicile, and unless it has both existence
and some right o," power there, it cannot be awarded any in
a foreign state.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
In Annis v. Buitcrticld, 58 AtI. 898, the following facts
appeared: The grantor in a conveyance fraudulent as to
Right of creditors was afterwards adjtidged a bankrupt.
Action: His trustee in bankruptcy sold and assigned to
A s gnent the plaintiff all the right, title, and interest
which vested in him as trustee for the premises fraudulently
conveyed, "together with any right to bring action, at law
or in equity, to enforce any claim against said premises
which was vested in said trustee in the interest" of the bank-
rupt's creditors. The plaintiff was one of the creditors of
the bankrupt, and as such might have maintained proceed-
ings to have the fraudulent conveyance set aside. It is de-
cided under these facts by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine that a mere naked right to set aside a fraudulent con-
veyance is not assignable, and an attempted assignment
thereof to such a creditor could not be enforced. See Prosscr
v. Edmund, i Young and Coll. 481.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
It is decided by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in
Brady v. Brady, 58 At. 931, that where a husband received
Advances by from his wife money from her separate estate to
Wife: improve his lands, the burden of proof in parti-
Presumption tion between the representatives of the husband
and the wife, after his death, is on his representatives to show
that the advances were a gift. Compare Adonc v. Spencer.
62 N. J. Eq. 782, also reported 56 L. R. A. 817.
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The Supreme Court of California holds in WVarner v.
Warner, 78 Pac. 24, that an antenuptial contract by which
Antenuptlal the woman relinquishes all right, claim, and in-
Contract: terest in and to the property of the man, either
Homestead as heir or otherwise, does not preclude her after
their marriage from filing a declaration of homestead on
property of his, the marriage imposing on him the-obligation
to furnish her a home, and the only effect of a.declaration
of homestead being to exempt the property from execution
and restrain him from alienating it without her consent.
Compare Keyes v. Cyrus, i oo Cal. 322.
INJUNCTION.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Ncelin v.
Harris, 58 Atl. 925, that a private citizen has no standing to
Maud... file a bill to restrain the enforcement of a writ of
to State mandamus against the State Treasurer to pay
Treasurer the salary of a judge under an act providing
such salary, the constitutionality of which act was attacked
but which was upheld in such court of Common Pleas.
INN-KEEPERS.
In Clancy v. Barker, 131 Fed. 161, the following facts are
presented: A boy about six years of age, a guest of the de-
Liability to fendants at their hotel, wandered out of the
auests room assigned to him, and into a room in which
a bell-boy or porter of the defendants was engaged in play-
ing a harnonica for his own amusement, and the latter acci-
dentally or wilfully shot the former with a pistol. Upon these
facts theUnited States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Cir-
cuit) holds that the bell-boy was not acting within the course
or within the apparent or actual scope of his employment at
the time of the shooting, and the inn-keepers were not liable
for the injury he inflicted. One judge dissents. The case is
particularly interesting in view of the rules established with
regard to the liability of common carriers for similar injuries
sustained by passengers. In such cases the carrier becomes
liable not because its employee was acting within the scope
of its authority in doing the passenger an injury, but because
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the carrier owes to the passenger a duty to protect him
against injury and insult, and when it fails- to afford him
this protection through the fault whether wilful or other-
wise of its -own employee it is liable. It Would have been
natural to expect a similar result in the case of inn-keepers,
but the decision in the present case is otherwise. Compare
Kraker v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657.
In this case, however, it is contended that as far back as
Calye's Case, 4 Coke, 202, 206, the rule has been otherwise.
Theprevailing and dissenting opinions are well worthy of
study.
JURORS.
The Supreme Court of Kansas-decides in State v. Kelley,
78 Pac. 151, that one who is otherwise qualified is not dis-
Disqualifies. qualified as a juror because he is more in favor
ton of the enforcement of the law that the appillant
is charged with having violated than of any other law. See
State v. Child, 4o Kansas, 485.
JURY.
In Coninon-wealth v. Williams, 58 Atl. 922, it appeared
that a juror at an adjournment of court, during a trial for
Separation murder, separated from his fellows thinking he
was allowed to go home. He was brou, ht back
in a few minutes, before he left the court-house, and testified
that he had talked to no one while absent, nor had he heard
any talk by any one about the case. Under these facts the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides that a verdict of
guilty would not be set aside therefor. Compare Common-
wealth v. Cressinger. 193 Pa. 326.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Cir-
cuit) decides in Patillo v. Allen- Vcst Commission Co., 13L
Amendment Fed. 68o, that an amendment to a petition.
of Pleading which sets up no new cause of action or claim.
and makes no new demand, but simply varies or expands the
allegations in support of the cause of action already pro--
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pounded, relates back to the commencement of the action,
and the running of the statute against the claim so pleaded
is arrested at that point. But an amendment which intro-
duces a new or different cause of action, and makes a new
or different demand, does not relate back-to the beginning
of the action, so as to stop the running of the action, and the
statute continues to run until the amendment is filed; and
this rules applies although the two causes of action arise out
of the same transaction, and by the practice of the state a
plaintiff is only required in his pleading to state the facts
which constitute his cause of action. See also IVItalen v.
Gordon,.95 Fed. 305.
MARRIED WOMEN.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, laying down the
general proposition that. the Act of June 8, 1893 (P. L
Secring 344), forbidding a married woman from beco n-
htusband. ing "an accommodation indorser, maker, guar-
Debt antor, or surety for another," applies only to the
technical contracts included in the words of the act, and does
not prevent the pledge of specific property to secure a debt of
the husband, holds in Herr v. Reinoeld, 58 AtL 862, that a
married woman may assign her interest in a life insurance
policy on her husband's life to secure her husband's debt.
Compare Dusenberry v. Insurance Company, x88 Pa. 454
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
In Moore v. City of Lancaster, 58 At]. 890, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania decides that where a city engineer
Grade of gave a property-owner an erroneous grade, and
Street the owner built a house according to the grade,
and some six years thereafter sold the property to another,
and the city subsequently cut down the street to the legal
grade, the purchaser had no right of action against the city,
as its liability would only be to the property-owner to whom
the erroneous information was given. Compare O'Brien v.
Railroad Co., i 19 Pa. 184.
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PATENTS.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Sixth Cir-
cuit) holds in Rupp & Vittgenfcld Co. v. Elliott, i31 Fed.
Coanditional 730, that it is within the right of the owner of
License to patents for machines, used by retail dealers to
Users fasten buttons on shoes for custemers, to furnish
such machines to users, without charge, under a license
which permits their use only with wire purchased from such
owner; and one who, with knowledge of such restriction,
manufactures and sells to such users wire put up on spools
in the exact form required for use on such machines, and
which is suitable for no other use, with the intention that it
shall be used on such machines, is liable as a contributory in-
fringer. See also Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka
Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288.
PROCESS.
That a defendant cannot claim exemption from the service
of process on the ground that he was within the jurisdiction
Privilege as a witness in a suit in a state court in which he
from Service was a plaintiff, where such suit was in further-
ance of the alleged actionable wrong for which the plaintiff
sues, is decided by the United States Circuit Court (D. Ore-
gon) in Iron Dyke Copper Min. Co. v. Iron Dyke R. Co.,
132 Fed. 208.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
In Austin v. Kucln, 7 N. E. 841, the Supreme Court of
Illinois holds that a promise to give one a certain amount of
Consideration money by will if she would marry a certain
of Marriage suitor and refrain from marrying another, and
subsequent contracts which were the outgrowth of such
promise, were within the Statute of Frauds, providing that
no action shall be brought to charge any person on an agree-
ment made upon consideration of marriage unless the prom-
ise or agreement shall be in writing.
In James IV. Scudder & Co. v. Morris, 82 S. W. 217, the
St. Louis -Court of Appeals holds that though the contract
of suretyship, to be binding, must be in writing,
suretyaip under the Statute of Frauds, the plea of the
statute is not available to a stranger to the contract.
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TELEPHONE COMPANIES.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
G-wynn v. Citizens' Telephone Co., 48 S. E..4 6o, that a con-
Contracts: tract by a telephone company with a customer to
Public Policy put in a telephone on condition that the customer
will not use another system is against public policy.
TRUST DEED.
In rc Miskey Estate, 58 Atl. 847, it appeared that a hus-
band conveyed to his wife certain real estate in trust, and
directed his wife during her lifetime to use the
net income for the support of herself and her
two children and such other children as might thereafter be
born. Under these facts the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
decides that the widow could use the whole income, at her
discretion, for the support of herself and children, and where
a child had left home she could not demand a portion of the
income from her mother. Compare Bowden v. Laing, 14
Sim. 113.
WILLS.
The questions that have arisen under the statutes requir-
ing a testator's will to contain some provision for an after-
Provision for born child, or else the will to be effective as to
Afterborn such child, have- given rise to varying decisions.
Child A new holding by the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania appears In re ANewhln's Estate, 58 Atl. 846, where it
is held that a contingent interest is a sufficient provision
tinder the following facts: A testator's will gave the estate
to trustees to pay the income to his wife during the minority
of the children and while his wife remained unmarried, and
to convey to trustees the share of his daughter on reaching
the age of twenty-one. It is decided that an afterborn daugh-
ter is sufficiently provided for, although she may possibly
never reach the age of twenty-one and, consequently, will
never receive anything under the will. The court adheres to
the general principle heretofore adopted that as to the ade-
quacy of a provision it has nothing to do, this way differing
from the decisions of some other states. The present deci-
sion presents a good review of the Pennsylvania authorities.
With it should be compared the earlier Pennsylvania case
of Williard's Estate, 68 Pa. 327.
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WITNESSES.
The Supreme Court of Georgia decides in Bank of South-
western Georgia v. McGarrah, 48 S. E. 393, that one whose
Transaction only interest in the litigation is as stockholder of
with Party a corporation, which is a party thereto, is not
since thereby incompetent to testify as to transactions
Decesed and communications with a deceased opposite
party in interest. See in connection with this decision Cody
v. First National Bank, 103 Ga. 789.
In re Hunt's Will, xoo N. W. 874, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin holds that under the statute of that state giving
piviitze at the privilege of secrecy to all information ac-
Physician quired by a physician from a patient in attending
the patient professionally in a proceeding contesting the pro-
bate of an alleged will of decedent, it is further held that
under the said statute the testimofiy and opinion of de-
cedent's attending physician as to her mental capacity, based
entirely on information derived from her statements or the
physicians' observation while treating her professionally and
for the purpose of such treatment, are properly excluded.
In Meekins v. Norfolk and S. R. Co., 48 S. E. 5ol, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina decides that where on a
Testimony In former trial of an action for death a witness was
Former permitted without objection to testify to intes-
Proceeding tate's hearsay and unsworn declaration as to the
circumstances attending the injury, and prior to a retrial of
the case the witness died, such fact did not authorize plaintiff
to introduce the testimony of the witness given on the first
trial as evidence of such declaration on the second trial-over
objection as to its competency. See also Garrett v. IVein-
burg, 5 4 S. C. 127.
